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A B S T R A C T
The commodity boom at the turn of the millennium spawned growing interest in development strategies based
on natural resources. The Brazilian government introduced a groundbreaking contractual clause to force oil
companies to invest into research and development (R&D) 1% of gross revenues from large oilfields, with the
aim of fostering technological development. To analyze the impacts of the R&D clause, we conducted 73 in-depth
interviews with key informants from the oil sector. We also carried out a survey of 156 project coordinators. Our
findings suggest that the R&D clause has strengthened the contribution to technological development by the
national oil company, meanwhile involving new actors. The R&D clause has also boosted scientific research,
technological capabilities, and innovation. However, it had a minor impact on fostering the relations between oil
companies and service companies, and technology-based firms have played only a minor role.
1. Introduction
The role of natural resources in economic development has been
widely discussed (Hirschman, 1964; Auty, 1994; Sachs and Warner,
2001). In the wake of the commodities super-cycle of the early 2000s,
the debate among policy makers and academics has gained momentum.
A consensus has emerged among scholars over which policy areas in-
tended to secure the exploitation of natural resources may be most
conducive to development (Sigam and Garcia, 2012; Sinnott et al.,
2010; Håvard et al., 2015).
In particular, two dimensions have been underlined: the fiscal and
the productive. The former, which has been investigated most, focuses
on macroeconomic management of rents generated by the exploitation
of natural resources. This approach examines policies to prevent ne-
gative impacts such as rentism and Dutch disease, as well as to secure
the proper use and distribution of rents.1 The productive dimension,
meanwhile, investigates policies aimed at fostering productive linkages
across all sectors. This perspective has acquired major relevance in
recent years, as most developing countries have attempted to emulate
the development path of Asia's newly industrialized countries (NICs).
For this reason, several countries have adopted industrialization stra-
tegies based on natural resources (Adewuyi and Oyejide, 2012; Teka,
2012; Paz, 2014).2 Some works suggest that the impacts of those stra-
tegies may differ due to the presence or absence of a prior industrial
base, or due to distinctive features of the institutional framework (Pegg,
2006; Lederman and Maloney, 2008; Mancini and Paz, 2016). How-
ever, scholars have paid little attention to technological development,
which appears to be crucial in fostering productive linkages (Pérez,
2010). Here we broadly define technological development as the pro-
cess of adaptation, diffusion, or innovation of technology deployed in
any productive activity. As the international diffusion of technology has
been historically uneven and asymmetric (Stewart, 1977; Fischer,
2015) from a development perspective, this process plays a major role.
Earlier research demonstrated that technological development was
vital to foster industrialization in the Asian NICs (Amsden, 1989), as
well as in other countries with abundant natural resources (Torres-
Fuchslocher, 2010). Technological development is therefore of utmost
relevance to developing countries with abundant natural resources
wanting to embrace a non-rentist or non-extractivist model of ex-
ploitation. But what factors can contribute to assisting that process?
Sabato and Botana (1970) argued that, to foster innovation, co-
ordinated action is needed between the national government, the pro-
ductive system, and scientific organizations. They argued that the state
should implement a national strategy to enhance and coordinate in-
terrelations among the actors involved in technological development.
However, this interaction is constrained by the specific historical and
structural characteristics of developing countries (Katz, 1976). Because
technological development is understood as an evolutionary process,
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path-dependence is critical. And as it appears to be a collective process,
it requires the collaboration of a network of involved actors
(Mazzucato, 2013). In sum, we shall examine the interplay between
those actors – the state, firms, universities, and research centers − and
institutions, including the structural characteristics of the country.
Within this framework, we shall investigate technological development
in the Brazilian upstream oil sector, to assess its impacts and its evo-
lution.
The case of Brazil is engaging for three major reasons. First, the
national government has adopted specific measures to foster techno-
logical development in the oil sector. After the breakdown of the state
monopoly, the government introduced a groundbreaking contractual
clause to force oil companies to invest 1% of gross revenues from large
oilfields into research and development (R&D), with the aim of boosting
technological development. We investigate whether the R&D clause
represents a major instrument of a resource-based development
strategy, or whether it is part of a strategy to attract investments to
stimulate technological development in the oil sector.
Second, as we will see in Section 2, the R&D clause forces techno-
logical cooperation between oil companies and science and technology
organizations (STOs). As per the definition of the National Agency for
Petroleum, Gas, and Biofuels (ANP in Portuguese), STOs can be either
public or private universities or research centers. In this regard, Brazil
provides a salient opportunity to investigate the driving factors of
technological development and to examine the interplay between in-
stitutions and public and private actors.
Third, within the current political context marked by revision of the
regulatory framework in the Brazilian oil sector, an assessment of
current regulation is meaningful. As a large share of Brazilian oil and
gas production and reserves is located offshore, especially in the pre-
salt area (ANP, 2017),3 exploration and production (E&P) is exposed to
major technological challenges related to the extreme physical and
chemical conditions of oilfields. Therefore, it is crucial to examine
whether the adopted policy has contributed to overcoming these chal-
lenges and to enhancing technological development. In short, what are
the scope and limitations of this policy, and notably of the R&D clause
as its major instrument?
Early research on the Brazilian oil sector addressed the evolution of
knowledge networks around the national oil company, Petrobras, until
the 2000s (Dantas and Bell, 2009, 2011). Silvestre and Dalcol (2009)
investigated the relation between geographical proximity and innova-
tion within a given agglomeration of suppliers to the oil sector. Other
studies examined the effects of joint research projects undertaken by
Petrobras and several Brazilian universities (De Oliveira and De
Oliveira Figueiredo, 2013; Porto et al., 2013; Turchi and Porto, 2013;
Turchi et al., 2013). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, our
paper represents the first attempt to investigate the impacts of the R&D
clause, by examining how it affects technological development through
its consequences on the strategies of the actors involved.
Our method consists of a structured case study, based on field re-
search conducted between June 2015 and February 2016. Our ap-
proach is consistent with Yin (2003): qualitative research methods are
the preferred strategy when the researcher seeks to answer questions of
“how” and “why”, and when the behavior of the studied population
cannot be controlled. Primary data were collected through self-ad-
ministered questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, and direct ob-
servation.4 Secondary data were gathered mainly through the ANP
database and reports by companies.
Our work is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the features of
the R&D clause and examines the investments it has generated. Section
3 investigates the impacts of the clause on the strategies adopted by the
various actors involved, along with the technological advancements
achieved. Finally, we discuss the main conclusions of our research.
2. The R&D clause: characteristics and investments generated
Within the context of privatization policies inspired by the
Washington Consensus, in 1995 the Brazilian government urged the
Congress to approve Constitutional Amendment No. 9, which allowed
for foreign investments in the oil sector. Two years later, the Congress
passed Law 9478/1997, known as the Petroleum Law, which ended
Petrobras’ monopoly and opened the sector to market competition.
Although a substantial share of Petrobras’ equity was sold off to the
market, the national government kept a major equity share with voting
rights.
The Petroleum Law established the ANP, which assumed the man-
date to regulate the oil, gas, and biofuels sectors, as well as to promote
competition through bidding rounds on oil and gas concessions.5
Among other functions, article No. 8 of the Petroleum Law awarded
the ANP the responsibility to stimulate the research and adoption of
new technologies for exploration, production, transport, refining and
processing of oil and gas. On that basis, in the “zero” bidding round
held in 1998,6 the ANP imposed a contractual clause to force Petrobras
to invest into R&D 1% of gross revenues from the production of large
oilfields subject to the payment of the Special Participation in any given
trimester.7 In 2005, the ANP approved a set of new regulations by
which any oil company that signs a contract to explore, develop, and
produce oil and gas must comply with the 1% obligation. The R&D
clause was regulated by ANP resolutions 33/2005, 34/2005, and 46/
2013, and by ANP technical regulations 5/2005 and 6/2005.8
The clause establishes that at least 50% of the mandatory value −
reduced to 40% for the contracts signed after the tenth bidding round
− must be invested in R&D projects undertaken by any STO accredited
by the ANP; again, an STO is defined as a non-profit public or private
university or research institute located in Brazil. On the other hand, as
much as the remaining 50% of the mandatory value may be invested by
the concessionaire in its own facilities, or in those of its affiliates, or in
collaboration with any oilfield services and equipment company
(hereafter, service companies) established in Brazil.
The R&D clause applies not only to the oil companies with con-
cession agreements but also to those subjected to other contractual
regimes, as follows. Production-sharing agreements9 require oil com-
panies to invest at least 10% of the mandatory value in R&D projects in
partnership with service companies. Contracts signed under the onerous
transfer-of-rights regime10 benefit from a reduced requirement: oil
companies must invest 0.5% of gross revenues from oilfields subject to
Special Participation, but they can only fund research projects under-
taken by STOs, not by firms.
3 In 2016, 94.0% of oil production and 94.9% of oil reserves were offshore. In the same
year, 77.0% of gas production and 88.0% of gas reserves were offshore (ANP, 2017).
4 See annex for details on respondents to questionnaires and interviews.
5 The Petroleum Law implemented a bidding system to offer exploratory blocks to the
market. The first bid occurred in 1999 and, so far, 14 rounds have been launched. In
October 2017, two additional rounds were promoted.
6 The “zero” bidding round was held in 1998 to ratify the rights of Petrobras on a few
blocks it had controlled prior to the end of the state monopoly.
7 Gross revenues are calculated based on ANP resolution 12/2012. Special
Participation is a financial contribution due to the federal government in each trimester
which applies to oilfields with very large production. It is regulated by article No. 50 of
the Petroleum Law, and by Decree 2705/1998.
8 In 2012, ANP resolution 34/2005 was revoked by ANP resolution 47/2012. In the
same year, ANP technical regulation 6/2005 was revoked by ANP technical regulation 7/
2012. In 2015, ANP resolutions 33/2005 and 46/2013 were revoked by ANP resolution
50/2015. In that same year, ANP technical regulation 5/2005 was revoked by ANP
technical regulation 3/2015. In sum, the R&D clause is currently regulated by ANP re-
solutions 47/2012 and 50/2015, as well as by ANP technical regulations 7/2012 and 3/
2015.
9 The production-sharing regime is regulated by Law 12351/2010.
10 Law 12276/2010 established an onerous transfer of rights from the Federal Union to
Petrobras to explore certain specific offshore blocks assigned to the company without
auction.
L. Mancini, M.J. Paz Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
2
It is noteworthy that the R&D clause was introduced as a separate
instrument from other policy measures. In particular, in 2004, under
the presidency of Lula da Silva, the national government promoted
industrial policy through the Industrial, Technological and External
Trade Policy, and through the introduction of local-content require-
ments in the oil sector. However, no mechanisms were introduced to
link the activities funded by the R&D clause with those initiatives.
Mandatory investments generated by the R&D clause have gradually
increased over time, totaling BRL 11.2 billion in 1998–2015, or BRL 6.3
billion in real terms.11 As Petrobras has maintained a dominant position
in the oil sector after the end of the monopoly, the national company
has been the major contributor to the scheme (Table 1).
From 2006− when the regulatory framework of the R&D clause
entered into force for all companies − until 2015, the ANP authorized
1361 projects undertaken by STOs, corresponding to BRL 4.6 billion
(Table 2).
It is worth investigating how the investments prompted by the R&D
clause have benefited STOs vis-à-vis oil companies and service com-
panies. Based on primary data, we estimate that STOs received a
slightly higher share than the minimum established by the R&D clause,
which is 50% of the mandatory value. On the other hand, oil compa-
nies, mainly Petrobras, invested the largest share of resources not
mandated toward STOs to projects undertaken in-house. Indeed,
Petrobras invested most of what it was not compelled to transfer to the
STOs into its own research center. This is in sharp contrast with other
oil companies, which invested only scant amounts internally. Finally,
service companies received less than 10% of total investment to un-
dertake research projects generated by the R&D clause.
One telling result of our research was that most of the international
oil companies (IOCs) have invested into R&D precisely enough to
comply with their obligation. Interviewees confirmed that oil compa-
nies have invested in R&D only because they were forced to do so by the
clause. However, we should acknowledge that these companies entered
into the upstream sector only few years prior to implementation of the
R&D clause. However, four oil companies − BG, Chevron, Shell, and
Statoil − have invested more than the obligation established by the
mandatory R&D clause. Moreover, BG and Statoil have each established
a research center in Rio de Janeiro. This was the first research center for
BG outside its home country, while for Statoil, it was the first such
center in a developing country.12
Because the IOCs have assigned a large share of their mandatory
investments to STOs, as revealed by interviews, their contributions to
technological development will be addressed through analysis of the
STO research projects undertaken. Examination of Petrobras’ con-
tribution requires deeper investigation, due to its historical leadership
in the sector; therefore, we shall address it first.
3. Actors, strategies, and technological results
The world oil sector has undergone considerable transformations in
recent decades. Since the 1980s oil glut, oil companies have progres-
sively outsourced their non-core business activities to service compa-
nies. These firms have specialized in high-tech activities and became
the largest spenders in terms of R&D within the oil sector (Perrons,
2014; Rassenfoss, 2016). Two main strategies have driven investments
in technological development by both oil companies and service com-
panies: cost reduction, and the exploitation of new reserves, especially
in deep water.
The interplay between oil companies and service companies is a
major feature of the upstream oil sector. The former have adopted a
model of “open innovation” that entails a collaborative approach by
involving both service companies and STOs (Chesbrough, 2003; Henni,
Table 1
Investments generated by the R&D clause (1998–2015), in millions of BRL.
Source: our elaboration based on data from database on R&D investments of ANP available online.
Year Petrobras Other oil companiesa Total investments (all companies) Annual percent change (nominal) Annual percent change (real)
nominal realb nominal realb nominal realb
1998 1.88 1.88 N/Ac N/Ac 1.88 1.88 … …
1999 29.00 28.30 N/Ac N/Ac 29.00 28.30 1442.6 1405.3
2000 94.20 84.93 N/Ac N/Ac 94.20 84.93 224.8 200.1
2001 127.27 109.54 N/Ac N/Ac 127.27 109.54 35.1 29.0
2002 263.54 209.77 N/Ac N/Ac 263.54 209.77 107.1 91.5
2003 323.30 230.32 N/Ac N/Ac 323.30 230.32 22.7 9.8
2004 392.59 260.42 11.12 7.38 403.70 267.79 24.9 16.3
2005 506.53 322.86 2.28 1.45 508.81 324.32 26.0 21.1
2006 613.84 379.07 2.55 1.57 616.39 380.64 21.1 17.4
2007 610.24 370.41 6.26 3.80 616.50 374.21 < 0.0 − 1.7
2008 853.73 502.48 7.13 4.20 860.86 506.68 39.6 35.4
2009 633.02 358.89 5.86 3.32 638.88 362.21 − 25.8 − 28.5
2010 735.34 407.40 11.58 6.42 746.92 413.81 16.9 14.2
2011 990.48 529.78 41.42 22.15 1031.90 551.93 38.2 33.4
2012 1148.76 595.08 77.92 40.36 1226.69 635.45 18.9 15.1
2013 1161.79 583.11 98.08 49.23 1259.87 632.34 2.7 − 0.5
2014 1246.47 608.62 161.10 78.66 1407.57 687.28 11.7 8.7
2015 894.00 423.64 136.96 64.90 1030.96 488.54 − 26.8 − 28.9
Total 10,625.99 6006.50 562.24 283.45 11,188.23 6289.95 … …
Notes: .
a Other oil companies have been forced to comply with the R&D clause since 2005; however, a part of the mandatory investment has been accounted for the year
2004, because the obligation is based on the application of Special Participation in the prior period.
b Real terms are calculated with base year 1998= 100, using the annual Consumer Price National Index (INPC) published by the Brazilian Institute of Geography
and Statistics (IBGE).
c Not applicable.
11 Real terms are calculated with base year 1998=100, using the annual Consumer
Price National Index (INPC) published by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics (IBGE).
12 Statoil inaugurated Research Center Rio in 2011. The company owns two other
research center in its home country of Norway and in Canada. BG invested in a research
center within the Technological Park at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro; more-
over, the company has launched the Research Center for Gas Innovation at the University
of Sao Paulo.
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2015). Considering this interrelation, we have investigated the strate-
gies of the actors involved in the R&D clause and their contributions to
technological development. First, we examine Petrobras, the leader in
this regard: in 2016, the company accounted for 81.5% of national oil
production and 78.6% of domestic natural gas production (ANP,
2017).13 Afterward, we analyze service companies and STOs.
3.1. Petrobras
The Brazilian oil sector operated under state monopoly from 1953,
when Petrobras was set up, to 1995, when the sector was opened to
competition. Technological development prior to implementation of the
R&D clause was marked by Petrobras’ leading role.
In its early stages, Petrobras adopted a passive strategy of adaption
and diffusion of foreign technology, later moving to a more active and
innovative strategy (Dantas and Bell, 2009). In 1963, the creation of the
company's CENPES research center was a milestone in fostering in-
house research, which was initially focused on the downstream sector
(e.g., refining). In the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, the Brazilian gov-
ernment urged Petrobras to increase its investments in E&P in order to
discover new reserves and ensure national energy security.14
The discovery of new offshore reserves in subsequent years en-
couraged Petrobras to create two internal divisions within CENPES
dedicated to basic engineering and industrial research. Within this
context, Petrobras intensified the network of collaboration with foreign
suppliers to acquire and assimilate the technology embedded in im-
ported equipment and services (Dantas and Bell, 2011).
In 1985, Petrobras launched the Technological Capability
Development Program on Deep Water Production Systems (Procap),
undertaken between 1986 and 1991 and involving 109 R&D projects.
Total investments in Procap amounted to US$ 69 million, only 20% of
which funded innovation projects (De Morais, 2013).
Procap was extended to a second phase, called Procap 2000, which
aimed at developing technology to enable exploitation of underwater
reserves at depths of up to 2000m.15 Procap 2000 was implemented
between 1993 and 1999 at a total investment of US$ 90 million. The
program consisted of 20 R&D projects developed by Petrobras in col-
laboration with 66 firms and 33 universities and research centers,
thereby expanding the network of actors involved in technological
development. In contrast with Procap, Procap 2000 assigned 80% of
total investments to innovation (Freitas and Furtado, 2001; Ortiz Neto
and Dalla Costa, 2007). The successful innovations achieved by the
Procap 2000 allowed Petrobras to receive in 2001 the prestigious Off-
shore Technology Conference (OTC) award for the second time.
The introduction of the R&D clause in 1998 prompted three major
changes in the technological strategy of Petrobras. First, the company's
R&D investments rose at a compound annual growth rate of 11.7%
between 1999 and 2015, reaching a staggering US$ 1454 million in
2011 (Fig. 1).16
On average, R&D investments undertaken by Petrobras in com-
pliance with the R&D clause constituted 45% of the company's total R&
D investments in 1998–2015, a strikingly high percentage. In short, this
intensity boosted R&D investments to the discovery of huge offshore
deep and ultra-deep-water reserves in the pre-salt area, which itself
prompted new technological challenges. The favorable context of in-
ternational oil prices occurring after 2001 should not be under-
estimated.
The boom in Petrobras’ R&D investments involved a major expan-
sion of its R&D center. In 2010, the company extended CENPES to twice
its original size, adding pilot plants and modern labs and equipment.
The number of researchers employed by CENPES rose from 1142 to
1775 between 2001 and 2016.17
Second, the expansion of R&D by Petrobras has been supported by a
strengthened network of collaboration with STOs, based on two in-
itiatives. On the one hand, Petrobras created a new internal division
within CENPES dedicated to cooperation with STOs. On the other, in
Table 2
Total investments generated by the R&D clause.
Source: our elaboration based on data from the database on R&D investments of ANP available online.
Company Mandatory investments
(1998–2015; millions of BRL)
% of total Investments in STOs
(2006–2015; millions of BRL)
No. of projects funded in
STOs
% of total
Petrobras 10,625.99 94.97 4312.32 1234 92.9
BG 172.88 1.55 193.77 39 4.2
Repsol-Sinopec 84.29 0.75 10.36 10 0.2
Statoil 83.21 0.74 36.86 19 0.8
Sinochem 55.47 0.50 16.96 12 0.4
Petrogal Brasil 49.95 0.45 20.57 12 0.4
Chevron 27.71 0.25 6.37 9 0.1
Shell 23.87 0.21 23.51 5 0.5
Queiroz Galvão E&P 23.60 0.21 7.43 5 0.2
Frade Japão 9.78 0.09 3.16 1 0.1
Parnaíba Gas Natural 6.55 0.06 8.31 2 0.2
Brasoil Manati 5.25 0.05 0.24 2 < 0.1
GeoPark Brasila 5.25 0.05 0.78 4 < 0.1
ONGC Campos 4.95 0.04 0.50 2 < 0.1
QPI Brasil Petróleo 3.47 0.03 0.19 2 < 0.1
BPMB Parnaíba 2.81 0.03 0 0 0
BPb 1.93 0.02 2.32 2 < 0.1
Maersk Oil 1.29 0.01 0 0 0
Total Brasil N/Ac N/Ac 0.09 1 < 0.1
Total 11,188.23 100 4643.76 1361 100
Notes: .
a Includes the obligations of the company Rio das Contas, which was acquired by GeoPark Brazil in 2014.
b The ANP authorized BP to invest in two R&D projects for a higher value than its obligation.
c Not available.
13 Data sorted by concessionaire.
14 Between 1971 and 1981, Petrobras’ investments in E&P rose from 26% to a stag-
gering 89% of its total investments. Source: authors’ calculation based on Petrobras data.
15 In 1996, Petrobras discovered Roncador, the first oil field in ultra-deep water
(1853m).
16 Petrobras has shown notably high R&D intensity: in 1999–2015, its R&D invest-
ments were on average a 0.75% of the company's sales. Source: Petrobras annual reports.
17 Source: Petrobras.
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2006 the company launched the Thematic Network project, with a total
investment of BRL 460 million through 2011 (De Morais and Turchi,
2013). The Thematic Network consists of 49 lines of scientific colla-
boration between Petrobras and domestic STOs related to areas of
strategic interest to the company, including exploration, production,
supply, and technological management. The Network was partly funded
by the R&D clause, although the exact amount is unclear, this data
being protected by confidentiality. Ferreira and Ramos (2017) argue
the R&D clause has been crucial to the development of the Thematic
Network, contributing to an open innovation approach that is more
coherent with the technological challenges of pre-salt reserves. CENPES
coordinates these networks and maintains continuous communications
with all members to ensure cooperation. Until 2013, more than 70 STOs
were involved in the Thematic Network (De Morais and Turchi, 2016).
On average, there are 15 STO researchers for every Petrobras researcher
involved (Fagundes Netto, 2014).
In 2000, the Procap 2000 program was extended into a third phase,
Procap 3000, which aimed at enabling the exploitation of underwater
oil fields at depths of up to 3000m. Procap 3000 received an invest-
ment of US$ 128 million over ten years (De Morais, 2013). Within this
program, CENPES signed 802 research cooperation agreements with 58
STOs and with 119 firms (De Morais and Turchi, 2016). In 2014,
CENPES counted 1145 agreements on scientific collaboration with do-
mestic STOs, plus 173 similar contracts with foreign STOs (Petrobras,
2015a).
Third, the expansion of Petrobras’ R&D activity boosted the number
of patents filed by the company at the National Institute of Industrial
Property (INPI) (Fig. 2). Following the implementation of Procap, the
number of patents grew steadily. However, Procap was dedicated
mainly to adaptation of foreign technologies; later, when Petrobras
began to target innovation through Procap 2000, it appears that pa-
tenting met with greater difficulty. On the other hand, during the ap-
plication of the R&D clause − which coincided with the boom in R&D
investments − the number of patents deposited by Petrobras soared to
record levels. Still, we have been unable to determine the exact number
of patents resulting from research projects funded by the R&D clause,
due to data confidentiality.
In 2015, Petrobras received for the third time the Distinguished
Achievement Award from the OTC for several innovations applied to
ultra-deep-water E&P. One telling innovation was the Steel Lazy Wave
Riser (SLWR). This was the first steel riser of its category in the world
that connected to a Floating Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO)
unit, with spread mooring designed to resist the motion of the floating
vessel in the harsh conditions of the pre-salt area.
The innovations implemented by Petrobras have allowed the com-
pany to reduce the drilling and completion time of oil wells in the pre-
salt area from 310 days (before 2010) to just 89 days (in 2016) – a drop
of 71% (Rocha, 2016). Moreover, Petrobras’ technological advances
allowed a sizeable cost reduction of around US$ 1 billion between 2013
and 2015 (Petrobras, 2015b).
3.2. Private firms
The R&D clause has affected the strategy of private firms in the
Brazilian oil sector. On the one hand, IOCs have been forced to invest in
R&D, but their financial contributions have been marginal in compar-
ison with Petrobras’ investments, as discussed in Section 2. Most R&D
investments by IOCs have been allocated to projects undertaken by
STOs. As we shall demonstrate, the interaction between IOCs and STOs
is newly emerging, whereas relations between Petrobras and STOs have
been consolidating for decades.
On the other hand, service companies have also been involved in the
R&D clause as recipients of investments. Though the share they have
received through the clause is minor, their participation in technolo-
gical development has been mounting throughout the clause's im-
plementation period. One compelling result is that, since 2010, world-
leading services companies have opened new R&D centers in the
Technological Park at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ),
located less than three kilometers from CENPES.
Drawing on interviews, we identified two factors that have moti-
vated service companies to set up research centers in Brazil. First, firms
have invested with the purpose of becoming involved and benefiting
from the R&D scheme. Service companies sought to receive funding
from oil companies to develop joint research projects, in particular with
Petrobras, which has accumulated considerable knowledge in deep-
water E&P. The proximity of the service companies’ research centers to
CENPES was seen as a positive factor in enhancing reciprocal colla-
boration. Second, service companies aimed at tapping into new op-
portunities in the supply of high-tech oilfield equipment and services
for E&P in the pre-salt area.
The establishment of R&D centers in the Technological Park has
generated new investments and employment in several areas related to
E&P (Table 3). These companies receive subsidies in the form of low
rental prices for the research locations as well as a reduced local tax
rate on the research activities conducted.18 However, our informants
did not consider these incentives as major factors for investments in the
Fig. 1. Petrobras’ total R&D investments versus Petrobras’ mandatory invest-
ments in compliance with the R&D clause, in millions of BRL and as a per-
centage of total R&D investments. Notes: 1) In order to compare total R&D
investments and mandatory R&D investments, we have converted the former
from US$ to BRL using historical series from the Central Bank of Brazil; 2) data
on total R&D investments for 1998 are not available.
Source: our elaboration based on data from annual reports of Petrobras and the
database on R&D investments of ANP available online.
Fig. 2. Number of patents deposited by Petrobras at the INPI.
Source: our elaboration based on the industrial property database of INPI
available online.
18 See Law 5344/2011 of Rio de Janeiro city council, which establishes incentives to R
&D investments in the Technological Park at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.
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R&D centers. Firms must comply with a mandatory requirement to
invest in a joint research project with the UFRJ19 – indeed, all these
companies have begun to cooperate with academia. However, this
collaboration mainly consists in the funding of traineeships for stu-
dents; moreover, two large firms, Schlumberger and Baker Hughes, are
not legally bound to the investment requirement. Most importantly, R&
D occurs within the firms, in that the research centers do not admit
external researchers, even those from partner universities.
Furthermore, service companies have not undertaken any research
projects with the technology-based firms (e.g., starts-up and spin-offs)
incubated at the UFRJ that operate in the oil sector. These firms are
strongly innovation-oriented, and their participation in joint research
projects with service companies could constitute a powerful channel for
fostering domestic technological development.
In this regard, in 2016, the ANP created the Scientific and Technical
Committee (Comtec), a collective body constituted by representatives
from the regulatory agency, the oil companies, and STOs. As Comtec is
mandated to establish the guidelines for implementation of the R&D
clause, it is highly recommendable that the committee addresses the
participation of technology-based firms.
In compliance with the R&D clause, Petrobras invested in joint re-
search projects together with service companies, which fostered tech-
nological innovations for deep-water E&P. A striking case of radical
innovation is the Oil-Water Separation System (SSAO), developed by
Petrobras in collaboration with the service company FMC Technologies.
The SSAO is sophisticated sub-sea equipment that enables the separa-
tion of oil and water extracted from deep-water reservoirs. Installation
of the SSAO in the seabed allows for considerable cost reduction versus
topside equipment.20 CENPES played a leading role in the project
thanks to its substantial knowledge of E&P in deep and ultra-deep
waters. The SSAO was manufactured in Brazil.
It is noteworthy that FMC Technologies retained full ownership of
the patent for the SSAO. Indeed, based on interviews, we found that
such intellectual property is a strategic asset for service companies as
they aim to commercialize the patent, whereas oil companies are more
interested in the use of the patented technology. The regulator at-
tempted to address this issue in the ANP technical regulation 3/2015,
which entered into force in 2016. The new regulation establishes
clearly defined percentages of intellectual property rights on the in-
tangible assets derived by projects funded by the R&D clause, to be
assigned according to the effective contribution of each entity involved
in the research. Should an oil company co-execute a project with a
small service company, or with an STO, the latter are entitled to at least
50% of property rights. On the other hand, when the service company is
a larger firm, the share of property rights should be negotiated among
the parties involved. Therefore, the allocation of patents will be ulti-
mately determined by respective bargaining power, as our interviewees
suggested.
Intellectual property rights are of utmost relevance for service
companies. Data published by the INPI reveal that service companies
greatly increased their filing of patents just prior to the establishment of
R&D centers in Brazil (Table 4). Our interviewees confirmed that the
number of patents deposited does not necessarily reflect the im-
plementation of new technologies but rather, and more importantly, the
strategy to hamper competitors prior to their expansion into the
country. As we shall explain, intellectual property rights also play a
leading role in fostering technological development in the STOs.
Another telling case is the Enhance Vertical Deepwater Tree
(EVDT), a subsea device for deep-water E&P jointly developed by Shell
and FMC Technologies. The EVDT is an upgrade of previous equipment
used in the Parque das Conchas oilfields, adapted to the conditions of
Salema and Bjuiprá oilfields. The major progress of EVDT consists in the
easy installation for E&P at water depths of up to 3000m. The collector
may be installed directly on the wellhead, which allows for faster well
completion compared to the prior design. The EVDT allows a 20% re-
duction in production costs and a 15% reduction in delivery time, thus
increasing profitability. The equipment was built in Brazil with 100%
local content and its patent was exploited to manufacture the EVDT
abroad and to deploy it in offshore E&P in Mexico and Malaysia. The
EVDT was awarded the OTC New Technology Award and the ANP prize
for technological innovation.
Finally, we found that service companies with research centers in
Brazil had not yet exported any product manufactured in Brazil from
patents initiated through research projects funded by the R&D clause.
Achievement of this result may require a longer research period than
has so far been observed.
3.3. Universities and research centers
In Section 3 we observed that, in compliance with the R&D clause,
oil companies must invest at least 50% of the obligation in research
projects undertaken by STOs. Table 5 shows the total investment re-
ceived by the STOs involved in the R&D clause, which amounted to
over BRL 4643 million in 2006–2015. In total, the clause funded 1361
projects carried out by 131 different organizations, of which 64 were
public universities.
A considerable share of investments received by STOs was assigned
to fund the construction, reform, or expansion of physical infrastructure
for scientific purposes, such as buildings, labs, equipment, and mate-
rials. Data from the ANP show that 948 of the 1361 projects undertaken
by STOs were related to scientific infrastructure, for a total amount of
BRL 2238 million, corresponding to 48.4% of total investments received
by these organizations. It is noteworthy that Petrobras funded around
95% of those investments. Moreover, investments in scientific infra-
structure were higher during the early years of application of the R&D
clause; in 2006–2009, on average, these investments represented
around 79.6% of total investments received by STOs via the clause
(Fig. 3). As our interviews revealed, this should be interpreted as the oil
companies (mainly Petrobras) strategically opting for a strengthening
of the physical infrastructure of the STOs prior to their investments in
research.
The positive impact of the R&D clause on scientific infrastructures
was supported by our respondents, in particular for those projects
funded by Petrobras (Fig. 4). Through interviews, we found that the
clause constituted a vital source of funding for Brazilian universities
that, as interviewees suggested, have otherwise faced severe under-
funding.
It should be considered that Petrobras had been cooperating with
Brazilian STOs since long before the introduction of the R&D clause,
which has thus served to reinforce prior relations (Ferreira and Ramos,
2017). However, the R&D clause has also managed to push other oil
companies to invest in STO infrastructure, although contributions by
these firms have been meagre compared to Petrobras’ involvement.
One striking outcome revealed by our interviewees was that STOs
benefited from full proprietorship of infrastructures funded via the R&D
clause. Ownership of buildings, labs, and equipment will likely
strengthen the capacities of those organizations.
Another major achievement of the R&D clause has been the pro-
motion of scientific research, in several areas but mainly in E&P
(Fig. 5). However, the biofuel sector has received only a minor share of
resources, despite its being included in the ANP's mandate to foster
technological development. Moreover, R&D in environment-related
areas has been scant.
It is worth noting that 39% of total investments allocated to STOs
(217 of 1361 projects) was assigned to programs devoted to the training
of human resources: i) the Human Resources Program of the ANP (PRH-
19 Mandatory requirements are expressed in a minimum amount of investments in a
given period, as regulated by the agreement signed by each firm with the Technological
Park.
20 The SSAO received the New Technology Award from the OTC in 2012, and the ANP
prize for technological innovation in 2013.
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Table 4
Number of patents deposited at the INPI by service companies (1998–2014).
Source: our elaboration based on the industrial property database of INPI available online.
Company 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Halliburtona 15 12 19 31 28 54 35 41 21 26 41 41 68 111 243 154 89 1999
General Electricc 0 0 4 5 8 14 2 7 7 9 9 34 26 57 41 15 2 1953
Baker Hughesb 1 2 3 9 9 17 17 17 21 32 65 101 156 156 120 86 69 1285
Schlumberger 5 17 30 24 26 22 17 14 10 3 1 3 0 2 1 19 20 377
Vallourec 1 0 0 3 0 0 2 3 1 0 3 5 6 6 4 5 5 166
FMC Technologies 0 0 5 9 2 2 2 6 3 1 12 3 2 1 4 3 7 116
Chemtech 6 7 7 3 3 3 5 1 8 6 2 4 3 9 1 6 6 80
Tenaris 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 4 2 8 2 3 4 3 2 3 37
BG 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
EMC 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Total 28 42 68 84 76 117 82 89 75 79 141 193 264 346 417 290 202 6019
Petrobras 11 15 11 11 10 17 15 18 20 10 14 13 7 7 11 7 4 921
Notes: .
a Includes Welldynamics.
b Includes BJ Services.
c Includes Vetco Gray and ABB Offshore.
Table 5
Total R&D investments received by STOs via the R&D clause (2006–2015).
Source: our elaboration based on data from the database on R&D investments of ANP available online.
Receiving STO No. of projects Investments (millions of BRL) % of total investments
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) 259 517.78 11.2
Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE) 37 161.23 3.5
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) 57 157.59 3.4
Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC) 44 124.11 2.7
State University of Campinas (UNICAMP) 72 123.50 2.7
Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) 71 114.04 2.5
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) 72 102.90 2.2
University of São Paulo (USP) 67 96.82 2.1
Fluminense Federal University (UFF) 25 78.01 1.7
Almirante Paulo Moreira Institute of Ocean Studies (IEAPM)a 2 73.88 1.6
Federal University of Sergipe (UFS) 20 57.78 1.2
Federal University of Espírito Santo (UFES) 21 57.59 1.2
Federal University of São Carlos (UFSCar) 22 54.36 1.2
State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) 27 52.33 1.1
Federal University of Bahia (UFBA) 37 51.84 1.1
Institute for Technological Research (IPT), São Paulo 16 49.39 1.1
Admiral Braz de Aguiar Instruction Center (CIABA)a 1 47.88 1.0
National Institute of Technology (INT) 15 43.23 0.9
University of Brasilia (UnB) 21 38.70 0.8
Instruction Center Admiral Graça Aranha (CIAGA)a 2 36.28 0.8
State University of Norte Fluminense (UENF) 22 33.59 0.7
Federal University of Ceará (UFC) 28 31.94 0.7
Federal University of Technology of Paraná (UTFPR) 12 12.61 0.3
State University of Minas Gerais (UEM) 5 3.47 0.1
National Institute of Technology (INT), PUC-Rio 1 3.27 0.1
Tiradentes University (ITP) 4 3.16 0.1
National Service of Industrial Learning (SENAI)b 2 2.79 0.1
LACTEC Institute 2 1.85 0.0
Federal University of Pará (UFPA); UFRJ; UERJ; Prooceano 1 1.59 0.0
Other organizations (of which): 393 2161.55 46.5
- Science without Borders 22 869.71 18.7
- PRH-ANPc 183 505.77 10.9
- Human resources (unspecified) 9 30.73 0.7
- Various organizations 179 755.33 16.3
Prominp (PNQP)d 3 348.72 7.5
Total 1361 4643.76 100
Notes: .
a Belongs to the Brazilian Navy. All projects undertaken by IEAPM, CIABA, and CIAGA have been financed by Petrobras.
b SENAI of the state of Santa Catarina.
c Human Resources Program of the ANP.
d The PNQP is the National Plan of Professional Qualification, which supports the professional qualification of human resources in the oil sector. The PNQP was
funded by Petrobras in the framework of the Program of Mobilization of the National Oil and Natural Gas Industry (Prominp).
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ANP); ii) Science without Borders; and iii) the Program of Mobilization
of the National Oil and Natural Gas Industry (Prominp).21 The PRH-
ANP program was created in 1999 by the regulator with the aim of
giving financial support to university students involved in scientific
areas related with the oil, gas, and biofuel sectors. Between 2006 and
2015, the PRH-ANP received BRL 505.77 million via the R&D clause,
fully funded by Petrobras. These resources were assigned to 183 pro-
jects of human resources training, undertaken by 34 universities (BRL
307.84 million) and by 19 research centers (BRL 197.33 million).22
Science without Borders was launched in 2011 by the Ministry of
Education and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, in
order to fund scholarships abroad for university students. This initiative
received BRL 869.71 million via the R&D clause, funding 22 projects at
eight Brazilian universities (Table 6).
The Prominp was established in 2003 at the initiative of the national
government, to enhance the training of human resources in the oil
sector.23 The program received BRL 348.72 million, funded by Pet-
robras via the R&D clause, which benefited three projects developed by
several STOs.24
In sum, a large share of investments generated by the R&D clause
was assigned to the training of human resources. Although Petrobras
was the largest contributor, the clause prompted other oil companies to
fund this crucial activity for technological development.25
It appears that the investments generated by the R&D clause were
paramount to fostering the training of human resources (Fig. 6). The
projects undertaken by STOs may have contributed to enhancing the
skills and capabilities of the researchers involved. It also appears that
the research teams have developed networks with other similar groups.
Moreover, our results suggest the research projects promoted both the
hiring of new researchers and the stays of researchers already involved.
Finally, funding from the R&D clause appears to have supported the
participation of researchers in scientific events such as conferences.
Research projects funded by the R&D clause have apparently
boosted scientific publications; our respondents agree these projects
Fig. 3. Investments in physical infrastructure received by STOs via the R&D
clause, in millions of BRL and as a percentage of total investments received by
STOs.
Source: our elaboration based on data from the database on R&D investments of
ANP available online.
Fig. 4. Assessment of investments in infrastructure received by STOs via the R&
D clause, percentage of total answers.
Source: our elaboration based on questionnaire to project coordinators.
Fig. 5. Activities financed by the R&D clause undertaken by STOs (2006-June
2016), as a percentage of total investments received by STOs. Notes: * Includes
a group of projects related with physical infrastructure (e.g. labs). * * Prominp
is the Program of Mobilization of the National Oil and Natural Gas Industry.
This data includes the investments assigned to the National Plan of Professional
Qualification (PNQP), to the Instruction Center Admiral Graça Aranha (CIAGA),
and to the Admiral Braz de Aguiar Instruction Center (CIABA). This includes
investments in scientific labs of BRL 66.39 million. For this reason, the per-
centage indicated here does not correspond to that in Table 5. * ** Includes
investments in scientific labs of BRL 14.97 million.
Source: ANP, 2016. Boletim ANP Petróleo e P&D, 36, August 2016.
Table 6
Investments generated by the R&D clause into Science without Borders
(2006–2015).
Source: our elaboration based on the database on R&D investments of ANP
available online.




























21 In addition to those three programs, the R&D clause has funded nine additional
projects of training of human resources (BRL 2.1 million).
22 Source: ANP.
23 See: Decree No. 4925/2003.
24 Source: ANP.
25 See annex for additional comments from our respondents.
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prompted new academic dissertations (82% of total answers for
Petrobras projects, 76% for other companies), along with the publica-
tion of papers in international journals (74% of total answers for
Petrobras projects, 72% for other companies).
A crucial finding of our research is that the R&D clause has appar-
ently fostered innovation. A large share of respondents agree that
projects funded through the clause favored the deployment of new or
improved products (57% of total answers for Petrobras projects, 59%
for other companies), as well as new or improved processes (58% of
total answers, both for Petrobras and other companies).
One striking innovation generated by an R&D clause-funded project
is the Buoy Supporting Riser (BSR). The BSR is a type of buoy that
prevents movements by the floating platform used in offshore E&P from
being transferred to the risers, thereby reducing the potential damage
caused by fatigue and increasing the useful life cycle. The BSR project is
an illustrative case of how the R&D clause has promoted “open” in-
novation, as several actors were involved: Petrobras, the service com-
pany Subsea7, the “Coppe” Institute at the UFRJ, and the Institute for
Technological Research (IPT). Through our interviews, we found that
coordination across all these actors was crucial, with Petrobras taking a
leading role in each stage of the process.
A research project funded by Petrobras and developed at the PUC-
Rio University resulted in the creation of the Direct Wire Optical
Supervision System, known as MODA. MODA is a real-time surveillance
system that identifies in advance, through optical fiber sensors, the
occurrence and propagation of structural damage along the subsea ri-
sers. The system allows the monitoring of production to avoid losses
due to damages, which may ultimately result in huge economic losses.
It is noteworthy that the MODA was patented by Petrobras; however,
the company licensed the technology to the academic research group at
PUC-Rio, which established a technology-based firm, Monflex, to
commercialize the patent. Our informants pointed out two factors be-
hind this innovation: i) constant interaction with Petrobras during the
research phase; and ii) access to intellectual property, which was con-
ditio sine qua non to exploiting the invention and to establishing a spin-
off.
Indeed, as previously observed, intellectual property rights play a
critical role in the oil sector. In the absence of data from the ANP, the
findings of our survey suggest that 64% of the projects undertaken by
STOs via R&D clause produced no patents. Moreover, where patents
were filed, STOs received the majority of intellectual property rights in
few cases (Fig. 7). This is partially due to the large share of investments
in infrastructure and training; however, based on interviews, we found
that, although the research projects were executed by STOs, oil com-
panies exerted powerful influence to veto the patenting of project re-
sults and to obtain a large share of patent rights.
A major finding of our survey is that 81% of respondents considered
that projects funded via the R&D clause have not promoted the creation
of new technology-based firms. Interviewees revealed that these firms
have yet to confront two obstacles. As mentioned above, researchers
from the STOs must negotiate with the oil companies over patenting
and ownership. Our informants suggest that many STOs do not have the
technical capacity needed to negotiate with oil companies, or the ad-
ministrative structure required to properly manage patents deposited
by their researchers.
However, the R&D clause generates a powerful conflict of interest
between STOs and existent technology-based firms. Many STOs provide
Fig. 6. Assessment of the investments in human resources received by STOs via the R&D clause, percentage of total answers.
Source: our elaboration based on questionnaire to project coordinators.
Fig. 7. Percentage of patent rights assigned to the STOs, percentage of total
answers.
Source: our elaboration based on questionnaire to project coordinators.
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contracted services to oil companies in several business areas where
those firms operate, and they are usually small companies managed by
recent university graduates. Our informants from technology-based
firms demanded greater financial support from the government to tap
into high-tech activities, and to compete with service companies. In this
regard, in 2015 the ANP revised the regulatory framework of the R&D
clause to force oil companies to invest more in joint research projects
with technology-based firms.26 However, the new regulation does not
address the conflict of interest or the financial needs of small tech-
nology-based firms; further research is needed to assess its impacts.
4. Conclusions
Our study has investigated the technological development process
in the Brazilian oil sector during the period 1998–2015. We examined
the effects of a mandatory contractual clause that forces oil companies
to invest 1% of gross revenues from large oilfields into R&D. The fol-
lowing conclusions can be drawn.
i) Although the R&D clause is a novelty in Brazilian regulation, it does
not constitute a stand-alone instrument in terms of research policy
in the oil sector. The adoption of the R&D clause should be con-
sidered within the historical path of Petrobras’ technological
strategy. Still, implementation of the clause has entailed a major
expansion of R&D investments. In this regard, the clause operates as
an instrument to regulate the process of technological development
that was already ongoing under the leadership of Petrobras. In
order to encourage the break-up of the monopoly in the oil sector,
the R&D clause was considered an instrument to enhance the par-
ticipation of new actors in technological development. As oil pro-
duction in the pre-salt area is expected to increase, with greater
contributions through the R&D clause from oilfields regulated by
production-sharing agreements, further research is needed to in-
vestigate whether the impacts of the clause differ according to
different types of contractual regimes.
ii) The R&D clause, together with prior initiatives such as the Procap,
constitutes a resolute governmental strategy – as suggested by
Sabato and Botana (1970) – which aims to foster technological
development over a lengthy trajectory. Although at early stages
technological development was mainly confined to the adaptation
of foreign technology, especially before the adoption of Procap
2000, endogenous innovation gained momentum in recent years to
enable the exploitation of the large offshore reserves.
iii) From the perspective of the actors involved in technological de-
velopment, the R&D clause has fostered the incorporation of new
players, though it has been unable to challenge the leadership of
Petrobras. The state-owned company was constrained from access
to leading technological capabilities in its early stages. However,
Petrobras has been constantly adapting its strategy over time, to
make feasible the exploitation of new oil discoveries, and this has
resulted in progressive technological leadership in deep-water and
ultra-deep-water E&P.
The incursion of leading-edge service companies and the partici-
pation of research centers bolstered the network of actors that
contribute to fostering research, innovation, and diffusion of new
technologies across the economy, as suggested by the national in-
novation system approach. However, it appears that a reverse
technological transfer has also occurred, where Petrobras has
transmitted its knowledge on deep-water E&P to service companies
via joint research projects.
The implementation of the R&D clause coincided with the break-up
of the state monopoly, which meanwhile favored the engagement of
oil companies in technological development. Although the partici-
pation of these companies in the R&D clause fostered research, their
investments have so far been relatively limited, as has their overall
contribution to fostering the network of actors. Moreover, from our
results it appears that, although the R&D secured stronger co-
ordination across actors, the collaboration between Petrobras and
STOs is deeper than that occurring between other oil companies and
STOs, the state-owned company having nurtured its partnership
with universities for a longer time.
iv) Our findings suggest the R&D clause boosted innovation, which has
enabled the Brazilian upstream oil sector to attain world-class
leading-edge technology. However, this process may face two
challenges in the near future.
First, the R&D clause should not be considered a panacea in terms of
fostering innovation; greater integration of the R&D clause into in-
dustrial policy is needed for spreading innovation from the oil sector to
the rest of the economy. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the amount of
investments generated by the R&D clause has been affected by fluc-
tuations in oil prices, as these influence the value of gross revenues,
which serve as the basis for calculation of the 1% rule. Second, in-
tellectual property rights may frustrate the deployment of new tech-
nologies, especially by STOs and small technology-based firms, which
face strong asymmetries of power vis-à-vis oil companies. Greater
public support to STOs is needed to strengthen their technical and ad-
ministrative capacities to manage property rights. As explained above,
the ANP has recently approved a new regulatory framework to address
this concern. Therefore, further research is needed to investigate the
impacts of the new regulation on the assignment of intellectual prop-
erty rights. Moreover, greater investigation is needed to assess whether
and why some STOs are more successful in fostering innovation and
patents than others, in order to support policy decisions.
Along with these achievements, the R&D clause faces several lim-
itations, which should be duly considered by other countries pursuing
the adoption of a similar institution.
i) Apart from Petrobras, the R&D clause has failed to bring together oil
companies and service companies, except for very few cases such as
the EVDT. The former have mostly funded projects undertaken by
STOs; simultaneously, the strategy of the service companies has
been primarily focused on cooperating with Petrobras. Considering
the interrelation between the technological strategies of oil com-
panies and service companies, greater cooperation between the two
sides is needed to boost technological development. In this regard,
the newly established Comtec may serve as a platform to foster this
collaboration, as well as to ensure greater integration and coherence
between R&D investments and national innovation policy.
Coordination between the R&D clause and local-content require-
ments is also needed to foster the nexus between research, innova-
tion, and productive linkages.
ii) Technology-based firms have so far played a minor role in the R&D
clause scheme. The new regulatory framework aims at encouraging
oil companies to invest in joint R&D projects with those firms.
However, current legislation does not address the asymmetry of
power between them, nor the conflict of interest between the
technology-based firms and the STOs. Greater integration and co-
ordination between the R&D clause and the national innovation
policy is needed to foster the participation of technology-based firms
in technological development.
26 See ANP technical regulation 3/2015.
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Appendix A
See Appendix Tables A1 and A2
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